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Previous analysis has shown that traders may opt for speci￿c technologies with no
joint productivity advantage as a way to commit themselves to trading jointly, but
only when long-term contracting is infeasible. This paper proves that speci￿city can
also be optimal (by relaxing the budget-balance constraint) in settings with long-term
contracting. Traders will opt for speci￿city when one trader makes a cross-investment
and either (1) this cross-investment has a direct externality on the other trader, (2)
both parties invest or (3) private information is present. The speci￿city (e.g. from non-
salvageable investments, speci￿c assets and technologies, narrow business strategies,
and exclusivity restrictions) is equally eﬀective regardless of which trader￿s alternative
trade payoﬀ is reduced. Speci￿city supports long-term contracts in a broad range
of settings - both with and without renegotiation. The theory also oﬀers a novel
perspective on franchising and vertical integration.
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1. Introduction
Speci￿city is usually viewed as an unavoidable consequence of technological specialization,
but a substantial literature has built up evidence that traders sometimes seek out speci-
￿city for strategic reasons. Even at the expense of average productivity, these traders use
technologies, investment strategies, ownership structures and restrictive contracts to reduce
their productivity on separation. For instance, speci￿c technologies lead to human capital
that goes to waste on switching ￿rms, and capabilities that go to waste on changing projects
(Williamson, 1985); speci￿c (non-salvageable) assets are wasted in alternative trading (Klein,
1980, and Williamson, 1983); ￿rms forfeit ￿exibility by sinking investments prematurely in
speci￿c projects (Arya et al, 2003) and by adopting narrow business strategies (Rotemberg
and Saloner, 1994 and 2000); franchisors often insist on holding the property lease of their
franchisees (Dnes, 1992); joint ownership can lead to asset waste when traders separate in
disagreement; and exclusivity restrictions, such as post-termination non-compete covenants,
reduce the return to human and organizational capital in outside trading (Bercovitz, 2000).
In each case, the claim is that traders intentionally increase relationship (or project) speci-
￿city as a strategic choice not dictated by technological necessity.
In this paper, I develop a theory that uni￿es these phenomena (whether speci￿city hurts
buyer or seller, principal or agent) through their common characteristic of implying waste
when their trading ends prematurely. Williamson￿s (1983) insightful explanation of speci￿c
assets potentially extends to other forms of intentional speci￿city. His argument is analogous
to the parable of the advancing army that burns its own bridges to commit itself to ￿ght
on (Schelling, 1960). Traders choose speci￿city to lower their payoﬀs from not trading,
because this partially commits them to joint trade. The speci￿city must distort upwards the
probability of joint trade to mitigate ￿holdup￿ of investments complementary to joint trade.1
Speci￿city then acts as a substitute for an assumed impossible, advance legal commitment to
trade. Williamson￿s theory is important because legal commitments to trade are sometimes
infeasible or ineﬀective,2 but this theory implicitly predicts that long-term contracting, when
feasible, will dominate and therefore displace intentional speci￿city.
My goal is to explain intentional speci￿city in settings where long-term contracting is
viable. This is important because most documented intentional speci￿city occurs in precisely
these settings. For instance, traders in franchising, employment, or ongoing procurement can
usually commit to future trade by agreeing to have past contracts (e.g., a company standard
form, perhaps with quantitative variations) govern future trading. Long-term contracts leave3
no role for intentional speci￿city in Williamson￿s (1983) model, because his non-contractible
investments are ￿self-investments￿: the seller raises its own bene￿tf r o mj o i n tt r a d eb y
investing in cost reduction. So (as established in Klein et al, 1978, and formalized in Grout,
1984), the seller fully internalizes its investment returns if the buyer commits to trade at a
￿xed price. Speci￿city is redundant. So in this paper, I move away from the self-investment
setting, and show how speci￿city can support long-term contracting by substituting for
budget-breaking ￿third-party ￿nes.￿
Long-term trade contracts need support when investments have externalities. For in-
stance, a franchisee managing a restaurant can train the waiters to be friendlier. This eﬀort
has a direct bene￿t on the franchisor, because it raises trademark value and royalties. The
franchisee￿s training eﬀort also raises the franchisor￿s payoﬀ from extending the franchise
contract, so it is a ￿cross-investment.￿3 The investor (seller) has no incentive to cross-invest
unless the buyer has the option to terminate trade.4 The optimal contract gives the buyer
the option to accept or reject trade at prede￿ned terms. For instance, a franchisor can either
accept continued trade with a franchisee at existing contract terms, or terminate the fran-
chisee (even if termination is not ￿at will,￿ the penalties are usually low at contract renewal
dates). Similar options are common in strategic alliances, procurement and employment
contracting.
M yc o n t r i b u t i o ni st os h o wh o wa n dw h e ni n t e n t i o n a ls p e c i ￿city is used to reinforce these
contracts. A typical option contract works as follows: the buyer has the option to accept
or refuse trade at a pre-determined price. The price is chosen so that the buyer accepts
trade only after high cross-investment (implying high quality trade) by the seller. The price
must therefore lie between the buyer￿s values for low and high quality trade. The seller then
earns this price as a reward for high cross-investment and is otherwise punished by having
to engage in an alternative trade. The diﬀerence between reward and punishment provides
the seller with an incentive to exert high investment. I derive a role for speci￿city via its
impact on reward credibility and punishment severity. First, when speci￿city reduces the
buyer￿s alternative trade payoﬀ5 and hence opportunity cost of joint trade, the buyer can
credibly raise the seller￿s reward. Second, when speci￿city reduces the seller￿s alternative
trade payoﬀ,6 it raises the severity of the punishment for low investment. These two eﬀects
combine: The traders can increase the seller￿s incentive by the amount that speci￿city reduces
the sum of their alternative trade payoﬀs. This permits a simple measure of speci￿city in
terms of the total potential waste, and allows my theory to unify analyses of speci￿city
aﬀecting either buyers or sellers.4
Using stipulated damages to increase the seller￿s punishment fails to resolve the incentive
problem, because this reduces reward credibility by as much as it increases punishment
severity. Allocating the damages as ￿nes to a third party would resolve the problem, but I
make the standard assumption that budget-breaking is not viable.7 In essence, intentional
speci￿city serves as a strategic solution to the budget-balance problem.
In the basic cross-investment model, option contracts permit the ￿rst-best without speci-
￿city so I need to identify a non-trivial demand for increased incentives. Two familiar
reasons why option schemes might give insuﬃcient incentives are the presence of stochastic
variation in returns and two-sided (non-contractible) investments. I focus on a surprisingly
neglected reason: cross-investments often have ￿direct externalities￿ in that they create ￿di-
rect bene￿ts￿ to the non-investing party.8 Recall how in the above example, the franchisee￿s
training eﬀorts bene￿t the franchisor independent of future trading, as well as having the
cross-investment bene￿t (contingent on continued trading). Similarly, in employment con-
tracting, worker eﬀorts that increase learning-by-doing usually bene￿t the employer directly,
in addition to increasing future productivity. There is no way to make the seller internalize
these direct bene￿ts, so intentional speci￿city may be needed to raise eﬀort incentives.
Renegotiation is not necessary for my speci￿city results. Prohibiting renegotiation allows
incentives to be increased slightly, but does not preclude a need for speci￿city (see 5.1). In
fact, renegotiation can be problematic. Che and Hausch (1999) argue that option schemes are
not robust to renegotiation because the buyer would always reject trade to force subsequent
renegotiation to a lower price. This problem does not arise when trade is decided at a
sharp deadline, because subsequent renegotiation is then too late. Nor need it arise when
trade opportunities disappear gradually, because if renegotiation is represented by ￿nite
horizon Rubinstein bargaining, then during each bargaining delay, trade can only occur
at the option price (see Ellman, 2004). In￿nite horizon bargaining on the other hand,
is problematic, because it permits reputational equilibria in which the buyer strategically
threatens to reject trade unless the trade price is lowered. Che and Hausch (1999) prove
that short-term contracting is then optimal. The incentives are then lower and speci￿city
can only help if it distorts the probability of joint trade upwards (as in Williamson, 1983).9
Fortunately, buyers can often escape this renegotiation problem by (directly or indirectly)
building a reputation for not making strategic threats.10 Sometimes, they eﬀectively commit
against renegotiation altogether, as when a ￿rm commits to improve its partners￿ terms of
trade over time (as in ￿up-or-out￿ employment), or a franchisor commits to homogeneity in
all its franchise contracts (see section 6).5
In summary, the main theoretical contribution of the paper is to prove that intentional
speci￿city complements long-term contracting in the presence of a budget-balance constraint.
Renegotiation is neither necessary nor suﬃcient, but the cross-investment eﬀect is essen-
tial. Uncertainty, two-sided investment, or most commonly, direct externalities of the cross-
investment, each oﬀer a suﬃcient secondary condition.
The paper may also facilitate empirical analysis by justifying the measurement of inten-
tional speci￿city as a single variable, based on total potential waste. To test my theory￿s
predictions against competing alternatives, I focus on the case of franchising.11 Franchising
oﬀers a good real-world example of how the theory works in practice. This is an impor-
tant policy application, because of the regulatory controversy over arrangements increasing
speci￿city, initially branded as ￿unfair practices￿ by law courts (see Klein, 1980, Williamson,
1985, and Dnes, 1992). Bercovitz (2000) has collected and analyzed a rich data set contain-
ing proxies for the externalities and levels of speci￿city central to my theory. So I use her
data to test my theory￿s predictions against competing alternatives.
My results are related to the seminal work of Klein (1980) and Klein and Leﬄer (1981)
who provide a theoretical foundation for speci￿c capital investments (brandname advertis-
ing, production capital and ￿illiquid contractual arrangements￿) in a market setting with
reputation-building but no formal contracts (and no renegotiation).12 The biggest theoreti-
cal diﬀerence is that they are forced to assume an in￿nite horizon setting and select speci￿c
equilibria (trigger-strategies),13 because they have no cross-investment eﬀect. By contrast,
I derive my two-sided speci￿city result in ￿nite-horizon settings with unique subgame per-
fect equilibria. So my cross-investment model provides a valuable contractual foundation for
Klein￿s (1980) insightful argument that franchisors can ￿assure quality by requiring franchisee
investments in speci￿c (nonfully salvageable) production assets.￿ Intentional speci￿city is
equivalent to posting ￿hostages￿ (see Williamson, 1983, above, and Raub and Keren, 1993)
that, absent joint trade, go to waste - the speci￿c returns in my model are ￿held hostage￿ to
continuation of joint trade. However, the hostage literature has not allowed for long-term
contracting, nor identi￿ed the role of cross-investments. My two-sided de￿nition of speci￿city
is also novel and can clarify the literature. For instance, Rotemberg and Saloner￿s (1994 and
2000) analysis of employee innovations ￿t sn i c e l yi n t om ys p e c i ￿city theory: the employee
eﬀorts to create a useful innovation are actually cross-investments (given their contractibility
assumptions), and the ￿rm increases speci￿city when, by narrowing its business strategy, it
makes its own capabilities more speci￿c to the desired employee innovations.
In a step towards creating novel applications, I also analyze the practical issue of imple-6
menting speci￿city when notdirectly contractible. When speci￿city is controlled by only one
party, it may be used for rent-seeking and will not necessarily enhance incentives. Nonethe-
less, organizational design may be used to allocate authority to parties with private incentives
to implement eﬃciency-enhancing speci￿cities (see 5.5). This often requires vertical integra-
tion, opening up an exciting and novel perspective on the question of integration.14
The paper follows a simple plan. Section 2 illustrates the key argument with a numerical
example. Section 3 sets out the basic model. Section 4 derives the maximal incentives and
identi￿es the role of intentional speci￿city. Section 5 analyzes robustness and generaliza-
tions, proving the centrality of budget-balance. Section 6 evaluates empirical evidence from
franchising, and section 7 concludes.
2. Numerical Illustration
A brief numerical example demonstrates my main claims. I begin by assuming that traders
can commit against renegotiating and then I establish robustness to renegotiation. A buyer,
B, wants a seller, S, to supply a pre-contractible trade (a good or service) over two periods.
For instance, B is a boss ￿buying￿ labor services from an employee, S. Before trade begins, B
and S can choose to impose a non-compete restriction on S that has no impact on productivity
within the relationship but reduces the external value of S￿s human capital. This speci￿city
reduces S￿s period 2 alternative trade payoﬀ from 9 to 0.I ￿x B￿s period 2 alternative
trade payoﬀ at 0. Even without intentional speci￿city, joint trade is optimal in both periods
but there is a moral hazard problem: the quality of each period￿s joint trade depends on a
single eﬀort/investment chosen privately by S in the ￿rst period. Neither quality can ever
be described in a contract.
There are two action periods (see ￿gure 1 below for a generalized timeline): S chooses an
eﬀort in period 1 (where trade is always enforced); in period 2 (after B observes S￿s period
1e ﬀort), B and S either engage in the precontractible joint trade or take their alternative
trading opportunities. Before period 1 commences, B and S can agree on an option contract
that ensures trade in period 1 and prespeci￿es a transfer price, p, that B owes S if B opts for
joint trade in period 2. (Note that p is the wage in the employment example.) High eﬀort
costs S 8 payoﬀ units while low eﬀort costs 0.H i g h e ﬀort gives B a direct bene￿t of 5 in
period 1. High eﬀort also aﬀects B￿s value from taking (period 2) joint trade at price p but
S￿s cost of supplying trade is ￿xed at 0:i fBr e t a i n sSa f t e rl o we ﬀort, B￿s payoﬀ is 10 − p
a n dSg e t sp, and if B retains S after high eﬀort, B￿s payoﬀ is 16 − p and S gets p.S oh i g h7
eﬀort has a cross-investment eﬀect of 6. After rejection, B and S take their alternative trade
payoﬀsw h i c ha r e0 for B and 9 for S - I treat ￿rst the case without intentional speci￿city.
High eﬀort is optimal since its total bene￿ts, 11 ( =5+6 ), exceed its cost of 8.B a n d S
need a scheme for which S￿s incentive (for high eﬀort) - the diﬀerence in S￿s continuation
payoﬀs after choosing high and low eﬀorts - is greater than 8 (his cost of eﬀort).
The problem is non-trivial. Even when S has full bargaining power, short-term contract-
ing (with p agreed ex post) leads to underinvestment: S negotiates p =1 6after high eﬀort
and p =1 0after low eﬀort. His incentive is too low (16 − 10 = 6 < 8) - he internalizes
the cross-investment but neglects the direct bene￿t .T h eo p t i o ns c h e m ej u s td e s c r i b e dc a n
help (see ￿gure 2 in Appendix C for a game tree representation with p set at 16−ε): before
p e r i o d1 ,Ba n dSs e tp at 16 as an exercise price at which B can take trade in period 2. After
high eﬀort, B is just willing to pay p =1 6since the net payoﬀ of 0 (=1 6− p)e q u a l sh e r
alternative trade payoﬀ of 0.W h e r e a s ,a f t e rl o we ﬀort, B rejects S since joint trade is then
only worth 10 and 10−16 < 0. This option scheme allows B to ￿credibly promise￿ to reward
high eﬀort with the ￿carrot,￿ p =1 6 , and to punish low eﬀort by rejecting S. In subgame
perfect equilibrium, S anticipates getting 16 from high eﬀort and getting his alternative trade
payoﬀ, the ￿stick,￿ of 9 from low eﬀort. S now has an incentive (carrot less stick) of 7 (16
less 9)t oc h o o s eh i g he ﬀort, but his cost is 8. So there is a demand for raising incentives
further and this is where speci￿city enters the picture.
Selection of the speci￿c technology prior to trading reduces S￿s alternative trade payoﬀ
from 9 to 0 - a potential waste of 9.B ￿ se ﬀort-contingent reward strategy is clearly unchanged,
so the carrot of 16 remains credible. Meanwhile, the stick becomes more severe - S now gets
0 not 9 in his alternative trade. S￿s incentive rises by 9 (the size of the potential waste) to
16. This easily overcomes S￿s cost of 8 and the problem is solved.15
Renegotiation robustness is clearest when period 2 has a sharp trade deadline. At the
deadline it becomes too late to renegotiate so B exercises any valuable trade option. Hence,
after high eﬀort, S would reject B￿s renegotiation oﬀers, anticipating that B will end up
exercising her (open-ended) trade option. B cannot force S to renegotiate. So B pays out
16 for high eﬀort as before. After low eﬀort, B would reject the trade option, so B and S
renegotiate (to joint trade) before the trade deadline. If B has all the bargaining power,
S gets none of the renegotiation surplus and his punishment for low eﬀort still equals his
alternative payoﬀ of 0. S￿s incentive is then 16, just as before. S￿s incentive falls as his
bargaining power rises but the ￿rst-best remains possible so long as B has at least 20% of
the bargaining power.8
3. Basic Model
This section generalizes the numerical illustration and de￿nes intentional speci￿city. There
are two production periods and two risk-neutral actors, B and S.16 In the ￿rst production
period, S chooses an investment represented by its private cost, e ≥ 0. This investment
is unavoidably speci￿c to the joint trade with B and is non-contractible. By contrast, the
intentional speci￿city decision (see below) is eﬀectively contractible and only aﬀects e through
its strategic eﬀect on incentives. In the second production period, S and B can choose whether
to engage in joint trade, denoted q =1 , or engage in alternative trades, denoted q =0 .17 I
adopt Hart and Moore￿s (1988) trade model with q = qS •qB where qS,q B ∈ {0,1} are S and
B￿s private trading decisions in the sequential trading game, TG: TG(i) S chooses qS; TG(ii)
Bc h o o s e sqB.18 Note that qB =0represents B ￿ring S in the numerical illustration, where
I left implicit S￿s willingness to trade, qS =1 .
Underlying Moral Hazard in e. Trade ￿quality￿ is never contractible. B￿s value from
trade depends on S￿s investment, e, chosen privately in period 1. To facilitate a thorough
mechanism design analysis, I model this as a binary choice: e ∈ {l,h}; I normalize l to 0 but
write l for low; h is the high eﬀort so h>0. B￿s value from the period 2 trade contract is
thus an increasing function b2 (e) which I write as be
2: bh
2 >b l
2. For simplicity, I assume here
(see 5.2 for self eﬀects) that e is a pure ￿cross-investment￿-i ta ﬀects the future trade payoﬀ
of the non-investing party, B and not S￿s own payoﬀ - so I can normalize S￿s period 2 cost
of supply to 0. B also receives a bene￿t, be
1, independent of whether trade occurs in period
2. This captures e￿s direct externality on B. I assume bh
1 ≥ bl
1.19
Speci￿city Decision. When S and B do not trade jointly in period 2 (q =0 ), they
receive their alternative trade payoﬀs, rS and rB. These payoﬀs are independent of e but
depend on a speci￿city decision determined before investment begins. The speci￿city decision
may be directly contractible (as with exclusivity, joint ownership, purchase of speci￿c assets,
and sinking of contractible, speci￿c investments), or it may be indirectly contractible (see
5.5 on authority transfer). I quantify speci￿city as the diﬀerence between the expected
surplus from the speci￿cj o i n tt r a d e( be
2), and the expected surplus from alternative trading
(rsum ≡ rB + rS). A decision is ￿intentionally speci￿c￿ if it raises this measure of speci￿city
beyond its value at the benchmark decision that maximizes B and S￿s average total surplus
(b￿ e
1 +￿ qb￿ e
2 +(1− ￿ q)rsum)w h e ne and q are ￿xed at their equilibrium average values, ￿ e and ￿ q.
Until section 5, I assume speci￿city has no eﬀect on b•
1 and b•
2,20 so the benchmark simply
maximizes rsum at r0
sum ≡ sup(rsum). So intentional speci￿city is captured by W ≡ r0
sum −9
rsum. Below, I compare the feasibility of incentive implementation using an intentionally
speci￿c technology (W>0) and using a benchmark technology (W =0 ).
Payoﬀs. I normalize the time-discount factor to unity and I denote the net cash payment
from B to S by t,s ot h a tB ￿ so v e r a l lp a y o ﬀ is be
1 + {q • be
2 +( 1− q)rB} − t, and S￿s overall
payoﬀ is −e+(1− q)rS +t. In equilibrium, q and t will depend on the original contract, S￿s
choice of e, contractual messages and renegotiation.
Contracts. Ba n dSc a nc o n t r a c to nq before investing, but (as standard in incomplete
contract theory) they cannot contract on the cross-investment, e,n o ri t sp a y o ﬀ consequences
(e, be
1 and be
2). The basic contract dictates a trade-contingent transfer, T (q),t h a tBo w e st o
S.21 Bo w e sT (0) for sure and owes an additional amount, T (1) − T (0), if trade occurs. I
denote this price of trade by p = T (1) − T (0).T h ec o n t r a c to ﬀers B the option of trading
at price, p = T (1) − T (0), subject to S being willing to trade.22
For generality, I allow B and S to send veri￿able messages. I can restrict to truthful
revelation mechanisms using a message game, MG, where B and S send simultaneous
messages, mB and mS from M ≡ support(e)={l,h}.23 This message game must be played
after B observes e and before trading. A general contract (T(m,q))m∈M2,q ∈{0,1} states how
the transfer from B to S will depend on the message pair, m, from MG and the trade outcome,
q, of TG. Note that the whole transfer from B goes to S because I impose Budget-Balance
as a constraint.
Here I assume that costless and eﬃcient (information is symmetric except in 5.4) renego-
tiation can occur at any time (see 5.1 for renegotiation prohibitions) via the Renegotiation
Gameform, RG: (RGi) nature selects B (probability, θ) or S (probability, 1 − θ); (RGii)
the selected agent can oﬀer a new contract; (RGiii) the other agent accepts or rejects.
(Generalized Nash Bargaining gives identical results.) The bargaining power parameter, θ,
is exogenous and (except in 5.1) I make,
Assumption 1: B￿s exogenous bargaining power is non-trivial: θ ∈ (0,1].
Timing. B and S can renegotiate immediately after any message game so I place a
r e n e g o t i a t i o ns e q u e n c eR G( i n t e r v e n i n g )b e t w e e nM Ga n dT G .T h i sg i v e st h et i m eo r d e r ,
MG-RG-TG.24 The original contract, T (m,q),a n ds p e c i ￿city decision are agreed before
period 1 (to aﬀect incentives for e). Until 5.5, I assume speci￿city is directly decided in the
original contract negotiations. The overall timing is presented in ￿gure 1.10
Stage 0               Stage 1                    Stage 2        Stage 3     Stage 4                   Stage 5   
      |                             |                          |                          |                         |              | 
B & S negotiate     S chooses e             Message        Renegotiation         Trading                 Contract  
contract (T(m;q))                                Game (MG)      Game (RG)          Game (TG)         Enforcement  
& specificity (W)                  B observes e    
Figure 1: Time Line
Until section 6, I simplify by assuming that joint trade is always optimal ex post,
Assumption 2: The relationship is stable: bl
2 >r sum.








So the ￿rst-best eﬀort level is high (recall l =0 ). I now turn to the second-best problem.
4. Optimal Contracting and the Role of Speci￿city
In this section, I solve for S￿s incentive, I,t oc h o o s eh i g he ﬀort under each possible contract.
This incentive is simply the diﬀerence between S￿s continuation payoﬀs in the subgames
following e = h and e = l. In subgame perfect equilibria, S chooses high eﬀort if and only if
the incentive exceeds the cost, i.e., I ≥ h. Any contract inducing e = h is optimal, because
utility is transferable, and (until 5.4) speci￿city causes no waste in equilibrium. So I derive
the upper bound on I given speci￿city level W. Then I show this bound is increasing in W,
and establish conditions under which there is a demand for using W to raise I.
Trade choice and incentives depend only on p = T (1) − T (0) (see Lemma 2 for the
case with message games), so T (0) can be used to distribute surplus (according to relative
bargaining strengths) in ex ante negotiation or ￿settling up.￿ I categorize contracts into three
groups: those that (absent renegotiation) induce trade (i) always, (ii) never, (iii) contingent
on high investment.
A long-term contract commits B and S to always trade if p ∈ [rS,b l
2−rB].25 At the trade
deadline (stage 4), there is time to trade but not to renegotiate and then trade. After e = l
or h, trade is attractive to both B and S at price p,s oBs e t sqB =1a n dSs e t sqS =1 .T h i s
is optimal by assumption 2, so there is no renegotiation and S￿s period 2 continuation payoﬀ
is p after both e = h and after e = l. So his incentive, I =0 , and he sets e = l.
B and S never trade (without ￿rst renegotiating) if the price is always either unattractive
to S (p<r S)o rB( p>b h
2 − rB). Trade then requires renegotiation at stage 3. I call this
￿short-term contracting￿ because the period 2 trade contract is agreed (in stage 3 renegotia-
t i o n )j u s tb e f o r et r a d i n g( a n dp =0is equivalent to writing no advance contract). In default
of renegotiation, S gets rS and B gets rB. These are independent of e, but on average in11
stage 3, S gets a fraction 1 −θ of the renegotiation gain, be
2 −rsum,a n dt h i sdoes depend on
e. Hence, S anticipates the continuation payoﬀ of rS +( 1− θ)(be
2 − rsum). His incentive is
















Even when S has all the bargaining power (θ =0 ), this short-term contracting may not
permit the ￿rst-best. S internalizes B￿s period 2 bene￿ts, bh
2 − bl













The remaining case has p ∈ (bl
2 − rB,b h
2 − rB]. Here, (absent renegotiation) trade only
occurs in the subgame following e = h: S always prefers to trade but B only wants to trade
if e = h (see ￿gure 2, Appendix C, for game tree). B has a non-trivial option so this contract
is called an ￿option scheme.￿ After e = h, there is no gain from renegotiation, so S wins
a continuation payoﬀ of p. Meanwhile, after setting e = l, S correctly anticipates that B
would reject trade (giving S a default payoﬀ of rS), so S renegotiates at stage 3 (earning a
fraction, 1 − θ, of the renegotiation gain, bl
2 − rsum). Adding gives S￿s continuation payoﬀ:





. So S￿s incentive is,







This option scheme generates a credible carrot of p after a high cross-investment, and a stick
of rS plus S￿s share of the renegotiation gains. Maximizing p at bh




2 − θ • rsum − (1 − θ)b
l
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from short-term contracting (see inequality





( > 0 by Assumptions 1 and 3). I record this result as a
lemma:
Lemma 1. Within the class of option contracts, the ￿exercise price,￿ p = bh
2−rB, maximizes
S￿s incentive at I = Iθ = bh
2 − θ • r0
sum − (1 − θ)bl
2 + θ • W.
Note how Iθ increases with W (at the rate θ-to-1). This captures the essence of the speci-
￿city eﬀect, but I ￿rst check that more complex, message game contracts cannot evade this
upper bound.
Lemma 2. General contracts cannot raise incentives beyond Iθ from the best option scheme.
The proof of lemma 2 is more involved (appendix A contains all proofs) but the intuition
is simple. The highest reward (for e = h) that B can credibly promise to S depends on12
her equilibrium service value (bh
2) relative to her opportunity cost (rB). The punishment






). The budget balance restriction drives the result: to punish S by ￿ning
him for the no-trade outcome is frustrated because S￿s ￿nes must then go to B, raising her
opportunity cost and reducing reward credibility as fast as the punishment severity rises.









so h>I θ implies bh
1 − bl
1 > θ(bl
2 − rsum) > 0 (by assumption 2). So the
direct externality, bh
1 −bl
1, is crucial to my speci￿city result, until I allow for stochastics and
two-sided investment (see 5.3). To summarize:












necessary and suﬃcient to implement e = h.
The bene￿t of speci￿city is that it relaxes the incentive implementation constraints. Here, its
cost is zero, but in general, increasing speci￿city reduces average productivity (e.g., because
separation is sometimes ex post optimal). There is then a simple tradeoﬀ (see 5.4) between
incentive bene￿ts and productivity costs. The key observation is that the incentive bene￿t
from speci￿city is increasing in the direct externality. So, after generalizing the model below,
I use empirical estimates (in section 6) of this externality to predict speci￿city.
5. Generalizations and Robustness
This section assesses robustness to some natural generalizations and alternative assumptions.
I show that my result depends on the restriction of budget-balance and not on renegotiation.
Uncertainty, two-sided investment and limited advance contractibility of trade can weaken
the incentive scheme, but I ￿nd that these generalizations can simultaneously strengthen my
argument for speci￿city.
5.1. Budget-Balance and Renegotiation
To prove the critical role of budget-balance, I need to establish that: (a) there is no incentive
problem when budget-breaking is feasible (so renegotiation is not suﬃcient for the speci￿city
result), and (b) speci￿c i t ym a yb en e e d e de v e nw h e nr e n e g o t i a t i o nc a nb ep r o h i b i t e d( s o
renegotiation is not necessary either). The ￿rst claim is evident from observing that a ￿ne,
F, owed by B or S to a budget-breaker after q =0 , is incentive-equivalent to speci￿city level,
W = F (and has no equilibrium cost).2613
Proposition 2. Budget-breaking ￿nes payable to third parties would permit the ￿rst-best
and make speci￿city redundant (in spite of renegotiation).
The second claim follows from proving, in Lemma 3, that preventing renegotiation permits
an incentive increase from Iθ to I1; substituting I1 for Iθ in Proposition 1 reveals the need
for speci￿city, formally stated as Proposition 3.27
Lemma 3. When renegotiation can be prohibited, S￿s maximal incentive from the class of
all budget-balanced contractual mechanisms is I1 = bh
2 − rsum (independent of θ).
Proposition 3. When renegotiation can be prohibited, intentional speci￿city W ≥ bh
2 −h −
r0
sum is strictly optimal if bh
2 − h − r0
sum > 0.
Note the impact of changing bargaining power - Observation 1: The maximal incentive,
Iθ, decreases when S￿s bargaining power 1−θ rises. This is a little surprising: incentives are
greater when B has the bargaining power even though it is S that makes the noncontractible
investment. Mathematically, Iθ rises with θ because bl
2 >r sum. The intuition is that
the surplus from renegotiation is only positive after S underinvests, thereby inducing B to
reject the trade option. So S￿s bargaining power only raises S￿s payoﬀ after low investment.
Therefore it reduces S￿s incentives.￿
5.2. Uncertainty, Continuity and Additional Investment Problems
The model readily adapts to a continuum of eﬀort choices, e ∈ [0,∞), and to uncertainty
in the joint trade value, be
2. In the deterministic case, p = be∗
2 − rB implements e∗ provided
that e∗ −e0 ≤ be∗
2 −(1 − θ)be0
2 −θ •rsum ∀e0 <e ∗. So intentional speci￿city of W relaxes this
implementation constraint by θ • W. In the stochastic case with symmetric information, an
option price p>r S motivates S to raise e if this increases the reward probability, σ(p,e) ≡
Pr(be
2 ≥ p + rB). This reward function can be maintained with higher incentives (up by
θ•W) via intentional speci￿city, W (since σ(p,e;rB,r S) ≡ σ(p + WB,e;rB − WB,r S − WS)).
The eﬀectiveness of the option scheme is nonetheless reduced by excessive uncertainty (see
N￿ldeke and Schmidt￿s, 1998, example with additive uncertainty and see 5.3).
When B makes a non-contractible and speci￿cs e l f - i n v e s t m e n t 28, i, the reward probability




2 ≥ p + rB
¢
. The intuitive concern is that
Bm i g h td e c r e a s ei so as to be able to threaten S with no trade (and bargain a lower
price). Indeed, B can decrease σ by reducing i.H o w e v e r ,Bg a i n st h ef u l lm a r g i n a lr e t u r n
on i when terminating trade is non-credible and B gains a share θ of these returns when
termination is credible. This pair of marginal eﬀects can dominate the disincentive caused
by the possibility of aﬀecting termination credibility. The option scheme can therefore remain14
a serious alternative (see 5.3).
When S￿s investment has self eﬀects as well as cross eﬀects - e.g., S￿s cost of performing
the period 2 trade, c2, might decrease in e -t h em a x i m a li n c e n t i v eIθ increases by cl
2 − ch
2
(deterministic case). So the option scheme is robust.
When advance contracting on trade is entirely impossible, B and S cannot use the stan-






, but can be
improved via an adapted option contract that gives S the right to de￿ne the terms and
speci￿cations of the trade option in period 2. S then extracts the full expected surplus from






(E (•) denotes the common period 1 expectations). Speci-
￿city cannot help. Fortunately, zero advance contractibility is extremely rare. The option
scheme only needs that e is a cross-investment with respect to some period 2 trade contract
that can be written at stage 0 - i.e., a contract with payoﬀs, b0h
2 >b 0l
2.29 The maximal credible
option price falls to p = b0h
2 − rB so Iθ falls by bh
2 − b0h
2 , but remains dominant if intentional
speci￿city is high enough.
5.3. Alternative Demands For Speci￿city
Speci￿city can be strictly advantageous even when the cross-investment has no direct ex-
ternality (i.e., bh
1 = bl
1). (a) Uncertainty can reduce the option contract incentives below






. This does not justify speci￿city if information







, but when B has private information, S cannot extract the full surplus and in-
centives may be insuﬃcient. The option scheme from section 4 is then optimal with suﬃcient
speci￿city to increase incentives (see Appendix B and Ellman, 1999 and 2004, for concrete
examples). (b) With two-sided investment, the adapted option contract gives no incentive
for B to invest at all, so the option contract solution can be optimal provided suﬃcient
speci￿city is available.
5.4. The Costs and Reversibility of Speci￿city
In the basic model, speci￿city has no cost because joint productivity is unaﬀected and
joint trade always occurs in equilibrium. In general, intentional speci￿city reduces av-
erage productivity (which by de￿nition, it cannot increase). For instance, relaxing as-
sumption 2 so rsum can exceed be
2 in equilibrium, speci￿city W causes average losses of
E(min(W, max(r0
sum − b￿ e
2,0))). The marginal cost of speci￿city W is usually much below15
unity,30 but may outweigh its incentive bene￿t in less stable relationships, so the model
predicts more speci￿city in more stable relationships (inverting the usual causal link from
speci￿city to stability).
Exclusivity restrictions and ownership structures that reduce separation surplus generate
a special type of intentional speci￿city, because the waste can often be avoided through
agreement after separation. Restrictions can be removed, assets retraded or eﬃcient uses
agreed. This reversal of the speci￿city to escape the waste is a great advantage in unstable
relationships, but the incentive eﬀect from this ￿reversible￿ speci￿city is slightly less robust.
In the gradual bargaining model, the threat of waste is not always credible. It depends on
the nature of alternative trading. Alternative trades are called ￿inside options￿ if they do not
change the value of returning to joint trade, and ￿outside options￿ if they eﬀectively preclude
switching back to joint trade (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). If the relevant alternative
trades (given any exclusivity restrictions and reigning ownership structure) are inside options,
the threat of waste is credible, because (whenever joint trade is optimal) reversing exclusivity
or adjusting ownership is irrelevant - it is not ￿on the bargaining table.￿31 However, in a
subgame following exercise of an outside option, joint trade is ruled out, so B and S would
try to renegotiate exclusivity and ownership if this can avoid the waste.32
5.5. The Contractibility of Speci￿city
So far, I have assumed that agreement to implement intentional speci￿city can be enforced
with no diﬃculty. This is reasonable for speci￿city created by an exclusive contract or
purchase of a speci￿c asset, but in many examples speci￿city is determined by private actions
of B and S that are not directly contractible. Provided S can observe the speci￿city before
making its cross-investment, B may generate speci￿city to increase S￿s incentives.33 However,
the main factor determining private preferences over speci￿city is rent-seeking: each trader
can strengthen its relative bargaining position by improving its own alternatives (e.g., S
increasing rS through general investments) and by damaging its partner￿s alternatives (e.g.,
S reducing rB by making itself indispensable). The ￿rst eﬀect reduces speci￿city and the
second eﬀect increases speci￿city. The level of speci￿city depends on which eﬀect dominates.
This in turn depends on the authority structure. So speci￿city can be adjusted indirectly, by
negotiating shifts in the authority structure. For instance, vertical integration that turns S
from an independent partner into an employee of B, increases B￿s authority and B may use
her new discretion to raise the speci￿city of the skills S learns on the job. This integration
is then a way to commit to higher speci￿city. More generally, B and S can adjust speci￿city16
by negotiating transfer of (bundles of inseparable) control rights (see in Aghion et al, 2002).
On the other hand, standard organizational theories (see e.g., Williamson, 1985, and Hart,
1995) may dominate the speci￿city motive in driving these decisions, as discussed below.
These alternative theories may explain speci￿city as a side-eﬀect (see below).
6. Empirical Application: Franchising
In this section, I use Bercovitz￿s (2000) detailed empirical evidence from franchising to test
my theory. The contractual and institutional details of franchising oﬀer an encouraging real-
world example of exactly how option contracting works. ￿Free-riding￿ is a signi￿cant problem
in franchising: each franchise unit￿s investments in service quality has a positive externality
(via the reputation of the trademark) on other units and particularly on the franchisor (who
receives royalties from all franchisees, up-front fees from new franchisees, and owns company
units). As noted in the introduction, the externality is partly direct (trademark value rises
independent of continued joint trade) and partly contingent on continued trade (i.e., a cross-
investment, because the franchisee￿s eﬀorts generally increase its ability and motivation to
supply high quality service in the future). Given the prominence of these two components
of my theory, it is encouraging to ￿nd that franchising contracts generally ￿tw e l lw i t ht h e
option contract solution, as I now show.
A typical franchising contract speci￿es detailed procedures that the franchisee must fol-
low, and obliges the franchisor to train the franchisee, but it cannot enforce many important
eﬀorts. To cope with this two-sided moral hazard, the contract speci￿es a sharing rule
whereby the franchisor has the right to a fraction of the franchisee revenues (the ￿royalty
rate￿).34 Franchising contracts are usually several years long and the franchisor seeks to
retain the right to terminate (with at most a moderate penalty).35 This creates an option
contract: the franchisee￿s reward from continued trade with the franchisor is decreasing in
the royalty rate and ongoing fees, so ￿xing these terms of trade is equivalent to ￿xing p in
the basic model.36
Even when the terms of trade are not explicitly ￿xed by contract, they may be eﬀec-
tively ￿xed by a franchise policy or legal obligation to treat all franchisees in the same way
(see evidence on homogeneity restrictions in Lafontaine and Oxley, 2004) or to avoid down-
ward shifts in any franchisee￿s terms of trade. Both these restrictions (homogeneity and
downward rigidity) may also prevent bilateral renegotiation. If the franchisee cooperates
in advance (e.g., to create evidence that special factors require changes, or to self-enforce17
hidden changes), the restrictions might be evaded, but by withholding cooperation, the fran-
chisee can certainly refuse to renegotiate over a non-trivial time interval. Ellman (2004)
shows that this can prevent the problematic eﬀect of renegotiation suggested by Che and
Hausch (1999).37 Since proposition 3 predicts speci￿city even when renegotiation is totally
prohibited, both cases support my theory.
In sum, all the theory components ￿t. It only remains to test whether intentional speci-
￿city increases with the size of the free-riding externality. Klein (1980) and Williamson
(1985) identi￿ed various franchising arrangements that had been criticized for infringing on
the franchisee￿s alternative options, (e.g., requiring short-term land-leasing and speci￿ca s s e t
purchase).38 If o c u so nt h es p e c i ￿city created by non-compete covenants on which Bercovitz
(2000) has built a systematic data set. A post-termination non-compete covenant limits the
franchisee￿s ability to operate any competitive business in a neighboring area for a de￿ned
duration of time after termination. The covenant generally decreases the franchisee￿s al-
ternative trade payoﬀ rS by more than reduced local competition increases the franchisor￿s
alternative payoﬀ rB.S oi tl o w e r srsum and oﬀers a contractible method of increasing speci-
￿city W. The expansiveness of a covenant, measured by multiplying its area and duration,
is therefore a plausible proxy for W.39
My theory predicts that this measure of speci￿city will correlate positively with the size
of the franchisee￿s quality/free-riding externality. Bercovitz (2000) proxies this externality by
interacting a proximity-based measure of reputational spillover with a proxy for brandname
importance.40 In her regression analysis, the free-riding proxy has a positive and highly
signi￿cant eﬀect on the expansiveness of non-compete covenants (p<0.002).41
This con￿rms the predictions of the speci￿city theory, but can alternative theories of
exclusivity restrictions also explain this correlation? Segal and Whinston (2000) generate
several alternative explanations of exclusivity42 that build on Areeda and Kaplow (1988),
Marvel (1982) and Masten and Snyder (1993). The key idea is that when investments have
￿external eﬀects,￿ exclusivity restrictions can help by: (a) inducing holdup of the restricted
party - e.g., to prevent retail franchisees from investing in promotion of other companies￿
products (see Areeda and Kaplow, 1988); (b) preventing holdup by the restricted party - e.g.,
a manufacturer, unable to trade with its major supplier￿s competitors, cannot expropriate
knowledge learned from that supplier (see Masten and Snyder, 1993). Speci￿city could then
be a side-eﬀect of exclusivity restrictions aimed at changing the marginal default return to
particular investments (as in the formal work summarized in Hart, 1995), rather than directly
aimed at shifting the diﬀerence in the absolute surpluses from joint and separate trading (as18
in my theory).
So could the non-compete covenants in Bercovitz￿s (2000) data be driven by the need to
resolve problematic external eﬀects of key investments? The answer is that there could be
external eﬀects, but an alternative explanation of the observed correlation requires evidence
that these external eﬀects are more important precisely when free-riding within the franchise
is more severe.43 Since non-competes prevent a franchisee from exploiting its local reputation
after a termination, they are likely to worsen the free-riding problem from the perspective
of external eﬀects. The most obvious application of this perspective therefore suggests the
opposite correlation. By contrast, my intentional speci￿city theory permits a direct and
convincing explanation. In conclusion, my theory receives strong support from this data.44
7. Conclusion
Intentional speci￿city can be explained even in settings where long-term commitments to
bilateral trade are feasible. The key condition is that one party makes cross-investments -
i.e., long-term contracts cannot prevent investment externalities. In my theory, speci￿city
reinforces the long-term contracts that motivate cross-investments. It serves as a substitute
for ￿third party budget-breakers￿ and is needed when the cross-investments have direct exter-
nalities - a widespread, though neglected, phenomenon. Speci￿city may also be needed when
the contractual parties suﬀer from asymmetric information or both make non-contractible
investments. Renegotiation is neither necessary or suﬃcient. Instead, the budget-balance
restriction is central to my theory.
These results prove that empirical observation of long-term contracting does not preclude
strategic explanations of speci￿city as a device for enhancing incentives. So my theory
provides a strong foundation for the regulatory debate in franchising initiated by Klein
(1980), Williamson (1983) and Frasco (1991). The logic of my theory is closest to that
of Klein and Leﬄer (1981), though they study a market setting with neither contracting
nor renegotiation. I have captured related intuitions in a contractual setting with a more
robust analysis based on unique equilibria and not reliant on in￿nite-horizon, folk-theorem
arguments.
My preliminary survey of the rich evidence on franchise contracting reveals that option
contracts are standard, and suggests that franchisors successfully use them to deal with free-
riding externalities, because they (like other parties with multiple partners or agents) can
readily escape the renegotiation problems predicted by Che and Hausch (1999). Furthermore,19
the evidence on non-compete covenants in Bercovitz￿s (2000) franchising data con￿rms the
predictions of my theory, while competing organizational theories do not oﬀer convincing
alternative explanations.
In my theory, speci￿city is equally eﬀective in raising cross-investment incentives, whether
it reduces the alternative trade payoﬀ of the cross-investor (raising the severity of the cross-
investor￿s punishment) or of the other party (raising the credibility that this party rewards
high investment). The simplicity of the resulting, surplus-based de￿nition of intentional
speci￿city should facilitate the measurement task needed for further testing of the theory.
However, the speci￿city concept draws together a variety of apparently distinct phenomena
(such as sunk costs, speci￿c assets, exclusivity restrictions and wasteful ownership struc-
tures), so each case will require careful analysis of diﬀerent alternative explanations.
The implications of this theory for authority transfers (e.g., via vertical integration)
that aﬀect speci￿city present promising avenues for further research. It will be vital to
gather evidence and carefully sift through alternative arguments from the property rights
and transactions cost literatures. The theory also promises to contribute to the topic of
internal design in organizations. The options (e.g., from ￿at will￿ contracts) at the core of my
analysis oﬀer powerful incentive devices when combined with designs that induce speci￿city.
In this way, my approach to speci￿city ￿ts into the broader project in which theorists are
beginning to address the twin questions of incentives and control rights within a uni￿ed
framework.20
Appendix A
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . For any implementation mechanism represented by contract T (•),
renegotiation after eﬀort level e and messages (mB,m S) induces trade with an adjusted




T (1,m B,m S),f o rrS ≤ T (1,m B,m S) − T(0,m B,m S) ≤ be
2 − rB
T (0,m B,m S)+θ • rS +( 1− θ)(be
2 − rB),o t h e r w i s e
In the ￿rst row case, B and S both want to trade (the ￿rst and second inequalities are S￿s and
B￿s, respective, participation constraints) but in the second row of this box, renegotiation is
needed for trade. Because renegotiation always leads to trade, S￿s period 2 payoﬀ is exactly
given by ﬂ T e(mB,m S).
I can restrict to truthful implementation mechanisms - see Maskin and Moore (1999). I
de￿ne ﬂ th ≡ ﬂ Th (h,h) and ﬂ tl ≡ ﬂ Tl (l,l),Sc h o o s e se at stage 0, to maximize his anticipated
overall payoﬀ. In subgame perfect equilibrium, he sets e = h if and only if h ≤ ﬂ th − ﬂ tl.S o
his incentive is I = ﬂ th − ﬂ tl. I now use the message game incentive compatibility conditions
to derive constraints on I -Im u s th a v e :ﬂ th ≤ ﬂ Th (l,h) else B would announce l at stage 2
after e = h;a n dﬂ tl ≥ ﬂ T l (l,h) else S would announce h and not l after e = l. Now, setting
p = T (1,l,h) − T (0,l,h),Ih a v e ,
ﬂ T











for rS ≤ p ≤ bl
2 − rB





for p + rB ∈ (bl
2,b h
2]
0 if p<r S or p>b h
2 − rB
which is maximized at p = bh
2 − rB so ﬂ th − ﬂ tl ≤ bh
2 − θ(rB + rS) − (1 − θ)bl
2 = Iθ.T h u s
the incentive is no higher than Iθ. As stated in Lemma 1, ￿ I can be implemented by setting
T(1,•,•) ≡ p = bh
2 − rB,T(0,•,•) ≡ 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Iθ (W)=bh
2 − θ • r0
sum − (1 − θ)bl





2 − (1 − θ)bl
2 − h
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θ ,a n ds u c hW is then strictly optimal since
it raises the implementable eﬀort level from e = l to the eﬃcient level e = h, and has no
costs (as joint trade is always optimal).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .The option contract described in proposition 1 is used in con-
junction with a ￿ne FB that is owed to a third party by B, and a ￿ne FS owed to the third
p a r t yb yS ,w h e n e v e rq =0 . The introduction of the ￿nes is equivalent to reducing B and21
S￿s alternative trade payoﬀst or0
B −FB and r0
S −FS.I tf o l l o w st h a tt h e￿nes are equivalent
to introducing an intentional speci￿city, W = F. The optimized incentive is therefore given
by I = bh
2 −θ •rsum −(1 − θ)bl
2 +θ •F and can be increased arbitrarily high. Collusion with
the third party is assumed impossible, but B and S can renegotiate so F is never paid out
in equilibrium, even in stochastic extensions of the model.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .The Revelation Principle justi￿es reduction to truthful message games
and full Nash implementation (see Maskin and Moore, 1999). Let ρe
mB,mS denote the proba-
bility of trade after eﬀort level e and messages mB, mS,a n dl e tve
mB,mS denote B￿s equilibrium
payoﬀs, and ue
mB,mS denote S￿s equilibrium payoﬀs, from the continuation game beginning































By incentive compatibility in the message game, vh
l,h ≤ vh




























































































2 − rsum equals I1 as stated. That I1 can indeed be achieved for any θ,i s
clear from observing that I = bh
2 − rsum = I1 from the option scheme, p = bh
2 − rB (setting
θ =1is equivalent to omitting S￿s renegotiation gains in the proof of Lemma 1).22
Appendix B








y, Pr 1 − π
;w h e r eπ is a probability
satisfying π • Y> y> 0 and h ∈ (π • Y,π • Y +( 1− π)y). In the adjusted option contract
where S sets B￿s option, S would set p = Y , extracting only returns to eﬀort of π • Y which
is less than h.45 This is insuﬃcient for implementing high eﬀort. In contrast, suﬃcient
speci￿city permits the ￿rst best: when θ =1 , p could be set equal to Y −rB without causing
any waste on renegotiation. Speci￿city with W ≥ π • Y − h (> 0)i st h e ns u ﬃcient and
necessary for optimality.
Appendix C
   S 
   B 
qS=0             qS= 1      q S=0             qS=1 
 S 
B 
 qB = 0           qB = 1                   qB = 0           qB = 1 
(rS, rB+b1
l) (rS, rB+b1
l)  (p, b1
l+b2
l- p)      (rS–h,b1
h+rB)  (rS–h,b1




Numerical example without specificity (rS = 9) gives the payoffs: 
(9, 0)          (9, 0)     (16-ε , -6+ε )              (1 , 5)         (1 , 5)            (8-ε , 5+ε )  
Numerical example with specificity level W=9 reducing rS from 9 to 0: 
(0, 0)          (0, 0)     (16-ε , -6+ε )              (-8 , 5)       (-8 , 5)            (8-ε , 5+ε ) 
     S 
e = l             e = h
Figure 2: Game Tree with no renegotiation (SPE underlined)23
Notes
1Segal and Whinston (2000) does not contradict this result, because they assume a ￿xed
probability of joint trade.
2Williamson (1983) emphasizes how limited wealth and liability may constrain enforce-
ment of damages, and limited rationality constrains description of future trades.
3Also called a ￿cooperative investment￿ (Che and Hausch, 1999): one party raises the
other party￿s trade payoﬀ.
4The buyer-seller terminology is not to be taken too literally: in the franchising example,
the franchisee is selling restaurant-management services, but also buying the right to use
the franchise trademark.
5E.g., speci￿city from the buyer agreeing to buy an unnecessarily speci￿c asset.
6E.g., from the seller agreeing to sign a non-compete covenant (see section 6).
7See Holmstr￿m (1982) and Eswaran and Kotwal￿s (1984) collusion arguments against
budget-breaking.
8N￿ldeke and Schmidt (1998) and Watson and Schwarz (2003) write ￿direct externality￿
to describe cross-investment, but that externality is trade-contingent.
9As noted in Segal and Whinston (2000, footnote 9), such distortions imply equilibrium
waste. In section 6, I present alternative organizational theories generating speci￿city as a
side-eﬀect.
10Such a reputation (of B) can be enforced by outsiders if S alerts them when B tries to
force S to renegotiate - Jolls (1997) reports that even judges restrict renegotiation induced
through potentially ￿coercive￿ threats. See also Ellman (1999, §2.5, and 2004), Lyon and
Rasmusen (2004), N￿ldeke and Schmidt (1998) and Watson (2003) for the view that option
schemes are robust to renegotiation.
11Most other theories are context-dependent (and they require identi￿cation of the marginal
speci￿city of particular investments, not just changes in the overall level of speci￿city).
12Baker et al. (2002) and Che and Sakovicz (2004) provide in￿nite-horizon models that
eﬀectively extend Klein and Leﬄer￿s (1981) insight to the case with two traders.
13Similarly in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), ￿rms follow trigger-strategies (￿ring workers for24
slacking); also, unemployment (which raises speci￿city by reducing employee alternatives)
raises the eﬃciency wage incentive.
14For instance, a ￿rm that needs its supplier to make cross-investments may want to
raise relationship-speci￿city by imposing an idiosyncratic technology (or even by fostering a
speci￿c corporate culture) in the supply unit. In order to impose this technology or culture
on the unit managers and workers, the ￿rm may need to acquire it.
15T h ep o t e n t i a lw a s t ei sc r u c i a lb e c a u s ei fBg a i n st h ev a l u e( 9)l o s tb yS ,t h e nh e ro p p o r -
tunity cost of retaining S rises by 9 and the carrot must be cut by 9 to maintain credibility,
exactly undoing the gain from increasing the stick.
16Principal-agent interpretations are equally valid, e.g. S could be an agent ￿selling￿ labor
services as in Kahn and Huberman (1988). Technically, I am adding direct externality,
renegotiation, and an explicit model of trading to Demski and Sappington (1991).
17Usually q =0represents a separate trade but can be a default trade like non-promotion
(see Prendergast, 1993).
18Simultaneity gives the same results, so I treat TG as instantaneous.
19Recall the franchising example and the idea that if S￿s investment is from learning-
by-doing, it rises with increased ￿doing￿ (or on-the-job eﬀort). Similarly in consulting, a
company (S) may prepare by asking questions that help the client company (B) to help
itself, as well as raising the client￿s future bene￿ts from extending the consultant￿s contract
(via q =1 ). Further, note that whenever a buyer B uses quality of a preliminary service as
a proxy for future service quality, it must be that e raises B￿s bene￿ti nb o t hp e r i o d s .
20Even a speci￿c investment simply lowers rsum when B pays contractible investment costs
in period 2.
21Any contractual terms enforcing period 1 activity are left implicit.
22This constraint does not bind. In period 2, e is only payoﬀ-relevant to B, so S￿s trade
preferences do not add implementation power. This is why separate veri￿ability of trading
decisions - allowing T (•) to depend on qB and qS (as implicit in Demski and Sappington,
1991) instead of only q -d o e snot resolve the implementation problem.
23Ba n dSb o t ho b s e r v et h en o n - v e r i ￿able event (S￿s choice of e)a n dIa s s e s sw e a kN a s h -
implementability.25
24There is nothing to renegotiate after TG, as trade must occur at stage 4 (see Ellman,
2004, for the gradual trade deadlines model). Renegotiation prior to MG-RG-TG is super-
￿uous as RG-TG guarantees ex post trade eﬃciency.
25I assume cooperative behavior (high eﬀort, trade, oﬀer-acceptance) under indiﬀerence.
26The budget-breaker must observe q or be alerted automatically (via a message game).
27I1 is also feasible when the period 2 timing shifts from MG-RG-TG to RG-MG-TG. This
is easily seen using MG0:( i )Bo ﬀers new contract; (ii) S accepts or rejects, because MG0-TG
is identical to RG-TG with θ =1 .
28This is a natural assumption in my applications. Two-sided cross-investment is more
problematic.
29The optimal prior contract uses terms (nature and quantity of trade) that maximize b0h
2 ,
though stochastic eﬀects may motivate use of a menu contract (with non-linear pricing).
30The separation probability is less than 1 (else e∗ =0 ) and intentional speci￿city may
increase joint productivity (as only average productivity must weakly fall). Note also that my
speci￿city result applies even when joint trade is always eﬃcient, unlike Williamson (1983)
where speci￿city must raise the probability of joint trade.
31This claim is valid in standard bargaining games where oﬀer-makers prefer to make
eﬃcient oﬀer, and also by the axioms of the Nash Bargaining solution.
32Reversible speci￿city is ineﬀective in the extreme case where the relevant alternative
trades are always outside options (see Ellman, 1999). Note by contrast that reversible speci-
￿city never helps in Williamson￿s (1983) theory (without liquidity constraints) because the
trade probability is no longer distorted.
33S might also create speci￿city when B observes it before signing the incentive contract.
(See also Raub and Keren￿s, 1993, analysis of prisoners￿ dilemma games embedded in a
hostage-posting game.)
34See Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), Lafontaine (1992) and Rubin (1978).
35In the U.S., some states restrict franchisors￿ ability to terminate by imposing a require-
ment of proving ￿good cause￿ (in spite of experts like Rubin, 1978, arguing for termination
￿at will￿), but franchisors can often respond by writing shorter contracts (at renewal dates,
they only need to show ￿lack of good standing￿ - see Klein, 1980, and Bercovitz, 2000, who26
￿nds that contracts are shorter when externalities are greater, con￿rming the theory). When
the right to terminate is suﬃciently constrained, the option contract is not feasible, the free-
riding problem is very hard to solve and franchisors tend to avoid franchising in such states
(as veri￿ed in Brickley et al., 1991).
36Franchisee investments (including the quality investment) usually have a self-investment
eﬀect, because a franchisee with lower costs or better local reputation earns more pro￿ts
under a ￿xed revenue sharing rule. This eﬀect is unproblematic (see 5.2) and the reward
implied by ￿xed trading terms increases with experience over time.
37According to my theory, franchisors may voluntarily build a reputation for contractual
homogeneity or downward rigidity to protect option scheme incentives in the face of rene-
gotiation. C.f., Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine￿s (1995) alternative explanation of voluntary
homogeneity.
38Klein (1980) and Williamson (1983) reject the legal presumption that such arrangements
are necessarily ￿unfair,￿ because the practises might be agreed to increase eﬃciency. My
theory provides a strong foundation for this argument despite the feasibility of long-term
contractual commitments.
39Law courts restrict the size of W, because they only uphold non-compete covenants that
satisfy a test of reasonableness. As explained in Bercovitz (2000) (motivated by Brazener,
1998), the courts eﬀectively tradeoﬀ allowable time and geographical constraints (hence the
multiplicative operationalization of the expansiveness variable). When upheld, non-compete
covenants are usually not renegotiated owing to franchisor reputations for non-renegotiation
and because multiple neighbouring franchisees are eﬀected. So the reversibility issue of 5.4
does not arise here.
40She measures the average distance between each outlet and its three closest outlets:
Nearby outlets share customers, so brandname perceptions depending on one outlet￿s quality
often aﬀect another￿s revenue. She estimates brandname importance with recent advertising
expenditures: customer sharing is more serious when the brandname￿s role is more important.
41She uses the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (in case of contemporaneous correlation
in error terms) to regress expansiveness of non-competes on the free-riding proxy, and on a
proxy for franchisee speci￿c investments. (The second proxy, based on franchisor estimates
of franchisee set-up costs, as in Dnes, 1992, has no signi￿cant eﬀect.) As a control, she
measures the fraction of franchisees in states that restrict termination. The option scheme
may become impossible in these states, so my argument for generating speci￿city disappears.27
The highly signi￿cant negative eﬀect of this control on use of non-competes is therefore
consistent with my theory (though perhaps, as argued by Bercovitz, 2000, non-competes
are avoided because also restricted in such states). Verifying robustness of the free-riding
proxy, Bercovitz (2000) also shows that increases in the spillover proxy raise non-compete
expansiveness when brandname expenditure is ￿xed, and this relationship becomes steeper
at higher brandname expenditures.
42They reject Klein (1980) and Frasco￿s (1991) claim that exclusivity can improve the
incentives for fully speci￿c investments. In contrast, by allowing for cross-investments (ex-
cluded from Segal and Whinston, 2000) and option contracting, my analysis provides a
supportive foundation.
43Also the alternative theory must be consistent with the option contracts identi￿ed above.
44Liquidity constraints present another possible explanation of speci￿city. For instance,
ac o m p a n ym i g h to ﬀer speci￿c training to indirectly oblige its liquidity-constrained workers
to ￿pay￿ for the training through low future wages. However, liquidity constraints are not a
pronounced problem for franchisees relative to franchisors, and are unlikely to have signi￿-
cant correlation with Bercovitz￿s (2000) free-riding proxy (given that the unit is operating).
More recently, De Meza and Selvaggi (2003) show that exclusivity constraints can enhance
investment by dissuading competitors from making substitute investments. Their theory
might be adapted to the franchise setting, but would require signi￿cant franchisee-poaching
by competing franchisors. The related theory in De Meza and Selvaggi (2004) is based on
the possibility of resale, so it does not apply to the basic franchise setting analyzed here.
45Even were h<p• Y , S￿s bargaining power causes average waste of (1 − p)y -a v o i d e d
fully in the standard option contract solution (when θ =1 ) . A n de v e nw e r ep • Y< y ,S
would only extract y which may also be too low for incentives to cover h.28
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